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We analyze quality differences in market hogs across alternative procurement methods. The test results show that alterna-
tive marketing (procurement) channels generate hogs of statistically different quality. However, the quality ordering of 
alternative marketing arrangements is not unique, but varies across quality attributes, and the quality differences do not 
appear to be economically signiﬁcant. We examine the relationship between alternative procurement methods for live 
hogs and the quality of the resulting pork products. The correlation coefﬁcient between the non-spot market purchases 
of live hogs and the Hicks’ composite quality index for pork products is positive and signiﬁcant, but the magnitude of 
that effect is small. Finally, we show that different types of marketing arrangements exhibit different price volatilities, 
subjecting the producers selling their hogs through these channels to different levels of risk. 
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The transactions between producers and packers 
in the swine industry occur in cash or spot markets 
or through different types of alternative market-
ing arrangements (AMAs). Alternative marketing 
arrangements refer to all possible alternatives to 
the spot market and include arrangements such 
as procurement or marketing contracts, produc-
tion contracts, and packer-owned production. The 
issues of farm-level price formation in the swine 
sector are capturing the attention of regulators and 
policy makers due to the declining importance of 
spot markets relative to the alternative marketing 
arrangements. A recently completed survey of hog 
producers and packers (Vukina et al. 2007) shows 
that in the 2004/2005 period only 24 percent of the 
market hogs were transacted through the spot/cash 
markets. As a comparison, in 1999, this share was 
36 percent (Grimes, Plain, and Meyer 2003).
Despite many theoretically and empirically 
unresolved issues about the impact of alternative 
marketing arrangements on price formation and 
discovery in the hogs and cattle markets, the pres-
sure on both federal and state legislatures to regulate 
all or some forms of packer ownership of livestock 
is mounting. As recently as Fall 2007, the Senate 
Agriculture Committee passed an amendment to its 
version of the 2007 Farm Bill that would prohibit 
packers from owning livestock for more than 14 
days before slaughter. Under the proposed amend-
ment to the Packers and Stockyards Act, packers 
could not, “own or feed livestock directly, through 
a subsidiary, or through an arrangement that gives 
the packer operational, managerial, or supervisory 
control over the livestock, or over the farming op-
eration that produces the livestock.”1
The motivations for using alternative market-
ing arrangments differ substantially between buyers 
(pork packers) and sellers (hog farmers). The use 
of alternative marketing arrangements by pack-
ers is usually explained in the context of various 
theories of the ﬁrm (see e.g. Gibbons, 2005). The 
fundamental economic questions of interest in this 
literature are: What alternatives does the ﬁrm have 
for organizing its activities? Why does it rely on 
independent suppliers for some services and on its 
own divisions for others? What determines which 
services are (or should be) purchased from outside 
suppliers and which should the ﬁrm provide for it-
self? Therefore, any theory of the ﬁrm must explain 
integration (i.e., whether a given transaction occurs 
within one ﬁrm or on the market) and should be 
able to predict integration for some transactions and 
non-integration for others (i.e., what trade-offs exist 
between integration and non-integration). 
When it comes to vertical organization of food-
supply chains, especially in livestock production, 
the literature mainly follows the transaction-cost 
1The full text of the “en bloc amendment” can be found on 
the Senate Agriculture Committee Web site, http://www.agri
culture.senate.gov/.Journal of Food Distribution Research 39(2) 78   July 2008
paradigm. The transaction-cost or rent-seeking 
theory of the ﬁrm adopted the deﬁnition of integra-
tion as the uniﬁcation of control rights, with the key 
variables characterizing the situation under which 
transactions take place being the degree of asset 
speciﬁcity and the amount of uncertainty in the mar-
ket (Coase 1937; Williamson 1985). For example, 
den Ouden et al. (1996) identify growing quality 
and credence attributes requirements by consumers 
(such as animal welfare, food safety, traceability, 
and environmental stewardship) as major driving 
forces for more contracts and vertical integration. 
Similarly, some export markets also require very 
speciﬁc product attributes. The Japanese pork mar-
ket, for instance, is famous for its speciﬁc consumer 
demands concerning taste, marbling, and cutting 
(Makise 2002). Since vertically disintegrated chains 
do not provide the required quality and are slow to 
adapt to new demands, the Japanese market has 
been mainly served by contractually bound or verti-
cally integrated pork producers from Denmark or 
the United States. According to Hobbs, Fearne, and 
Spriggs (2002), various food crises such as mad cow 
disease are another reason for quality uncertainty 
becoming the major concern in agribusiness. Gener-
ally speaking, information externalities arising from 
uncertainties in detecting food quality may be rea-
sons why vertical coordination is used to circumvent 
the marketplace (Hennesy 1996). Organizing the 
information ﬂow along the supply chain for trans-
mitting the changing customer demands to the farm 
stages is considered more transaction-cost efﬁcient 
under contracts and in vertically integrated systems 
than in the spot markets. 
The motivations and incentives of farmers to 
engage in alternative marketing arrangements have 
also been studied by agricultural economists (for a 
recent survey see Schulze, Spiller, and Theuvsen 
2006). The majority of research in this area argues 
that contracts are a highly preferable option for 
farmers to reduce their risk exposure. For example, 
Johnson and Foster (1994) found that risk-neutral 
hog producers would prefer independent produc-
tion and risk-averse producers would prefer to 
choose among various types contracts. Similarly, 
Pennings and Smidts (2000) found that the degree 
of risk aversion is important in explaining owner-
managers’ choices between relatively safe ﬁxed-
price contracts versus spot-market transactions in 
the swine industry. Using sharecropping contracts, 
Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) showed that if one 
controls for the endogenous matching between prin-
cipals (landlords) and agents (tenants), the agent’s 
risk aversion appears to signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the 
contract choice.
This paper focuses on quality considerations as 
the major driver for the use of alternative marketing 
arrangements by pork packers and risk management 
as the major driver for their use by hog farmers. We 
hypothesize that if the packers introduced various 
alternative marketing arrangements with the ob-
jective to procure high-quality hogs, we should be 
able to detect signiﬁcant difference between hogs 
procured through them relative to hogs procured 
through the spot market. Also, if the farmers’ main 
motivation for the use of alternative marketing ar-
rangements is risk mitigation, assuming that farmers 
correctly self-select themselves into contracts that 
correspond to their risk-aversion types, we should 
ﬁnd that different alternative marketing arrange-
ments provide different levels of price insurance 
(risk protection) as measured by the volatility of 
their income streams.
The results show that alternative marketing (pro-
curement) channels generate hogs of statistically 
different quality. However, the quality ordering of 
alternative marketing arrangements is not unique, 
but varies across quality attributes, and the quality 
differences do not appear to be economically sig-
niﬁcant. Also, the relationship between the higher-
order (non-spot) procurement methods for live hogs 
intended for slaughter and the quality of obtained 
pork products is positive, but the magnitude of this 
correlation coefﬁcient is rather small. Finally, the 
results conﬁrm our conjecture that the magnitude of 
risk that hog producers are exposed to varies with 
the marketing arrangements through which hogs 
are transacted.
Reasons for Using Alternative Marketing 
Arrangements by Hog Producers and Pork 
Packers
As a part of the congressionally mandated Livestock 
and Meat Marketing Study (see Vukina et al. 2007) 
a recently completed survey of buyers and sellers of 
live hogs indicated a number of different economic 
incentives associated with using alternative market-
ing arrangements or the cash market (see Cates et 
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to the survey, the three most important reasons 
for selling their hogs using the cash markets are: 
independence—complete control and ﬂexibility of 
own business (80 percent of respondents); ability 
to beneﬁt from favorable market conditions (41 
percent); and ability to sell hogs at higher prices 
(35 percent). For the same group, the three most im-
portant reasons for using the alternative marketing 
arrangements to sell hogs are: the reduction in risk 
exposure (76 percent of respondents); the reduction 
in price variability (44 percent); and improvement 
in securing a buyer (39 percent).
For packers responding to the survey who only 
use cash or spot markets for procuring market hogs, 
the three most important reasons for doing so are: 
independence—complete control and ﬂexibility (60 
percent); the ability to purchase hogs at lower prices 
(37 percent); and the ability to secure higher-quality 
hogs (36 percent). For packers responding to the 
survey who use alternative marketing arrangements 
for procuring market hogs, the three most important 
reasons for doing so are: improvement in week-to-
week supply management (62 percent); ability to 
secure higher-quality market hogs (60 percent); and 
ability to allow better market access (40 percent). 
These results provide two interesting insights 
which do not precisely coincide with the hypotheses 
that one could derive from the existing literature 
on the vertical integration and contracting in the 
livestock industries. First, the push toward increased 
pork quality dictated by consumers is unlikely to 
produce any noticeable shift toward greater use of 
alternative marketing arrangements because views 
of different market participants about which market-
ing arrangement produces higher-quality hogs dif-
fer. Second, the incentives to stay independent and 
in full control of one’s own business counteract the 
risk-aversion considerations, with the direction of 
the net effect toward greater use of alternative mar-
keting arrangements being ambiguous and likely 
small. These results provide the motivation to study 
the quality and risk shifting issues associated with 
various alternative marketing arrangements in the 
pork industry empirically.
In order to carry out the empirical analyses we 
use the USDA/AMS Mandatory Price Reports 
(MPR) data.2 The MPR records the transactions of 
National Daily Direct Hog Prior Day—Slaughtered 
Swine through the following categories of market-
ing arrangements (MAs):
•  Negotiated Purchases (MA1): Cash or spot-
market purchase of hogs by a packer from 
a producer when there is an agreement on 
base price and a delivery day not more than 
14 days after the date on which the livestock 
are committed to the packer.
•  Other Market Formula Purchases (MA2): 
Purchase of hogs by a packer in which the 
pricing mechanism is a formula price based 
on any market other than the market for hogs, 
pork, or pork product. This includes formula 
purchases where the price formula is based on 
one or more futures and options contracts.
•  Swine or Pork Market Formula Purchases 
(MA3): Purchase of hogs by a packer in 
which the pricing mechanism is a formula 
price based on a market for hogs, pork, or a 
pork product other than any formula purchase 
with ﬂoor, window, or ceiling price, or a fu-
tures options contract for hogs, pork, or pork 
product.
•  Other Purchase Arrangements (MA4): Pur-
chase of hogs by a packer that is not a negoti-
ated purchase, hogs or pork market formula 
purchase, or other market formula purchase 
and does not involve packer-owned swine. 
This would include long-term contract agree-
ments; ﬁxed-price contracts; cost-of-produc-
tion formulas; and formula purchases with a 
ﬂoor, window, or ceiling price.
•  Packer Owned (MA5): Hogs that a packer, in-
cluding a subsidiary or afﬁliate of the packer, 
owns for at least 14 days immediately before 
slaughter. 
•  Packer Sold (MA6): Hogs that are owned by 
a packer, including a subsidiary or afﬁliate 
of the packer, for more than 14 days imme-
diately before sale for slaughter and are sold 
for slaughter to another packer. 
Ranking of Alternative Marketing Arrangements 
by Quality Attributes
This section analyzes the differences in the quality 
of ﬁnished market hogs (barrows and gilts) intend- 2 MPR is available at http://mpr.datamart.ams.usda.gov.Journal of Food Distribution Research 39(2) 80   July 2008
ed for slaughter across marketing arrangements 
through which they were procured. Regardless 
of the marketing arrangement used to procure the 
ﬁnished market hogs, the animals are shipped to a 
packer, and after being slaughtered, the carcasses 
are inspected for wholesomeness by USDA/FSIS 
or by a state government inspection system. Unlike 
beef, pork is rarely quality graded by USDA/AMS.3 
Instead packers rely on other measures of quality. 
The pork industry began using its own measure-
ments and moved away from grades in the early 
1990s. The main problem with the USDA standards 
was that slaughtered animals were not well-differ-
entiated by quality, so approximately 85 percent or 
more of the hogs were graded as U.S. No. 1–2.
The deﬁnitions of quality indicators based on 
Mandatory Price Report data are as follows: 
•Average lean percentage (in percent): Value 
equal to the average percentage of the carcass 
weight composing lean meat.
•Loin-eye area (in square inches): The surface 
area of the Longissimus dorsi muscle at the 
tenth rib of a pork carcass.
•Average loin depth (in inches): Average muscle 
depth measured between the third and fourth 
rib from the last rib, 7 cm from the carcass 
split.
•Average backfat (in inches): Average fat thick-
ness measured between the third and fourth 
rib from the last rib, 7 cm from the carcass 
split.
•Fat-free lean index: Index measuring the ﬁnal 
carcass fat-free lean as a percentage of the 
carcass. This index can be calculated and 
estimated from a fat probe between the third 
and fourth rib, 7 cm off the midline of the hot 
carcass. The fat-free lean index is calculated 
as follows: 51.537 + (0.035 × Carcass, lb) − 
(12.260 × Backfat, inch).
The data represent daily observations for the 
period between August 3, 2001, and September 
30, 2005. The summary statistics for ﬁve differ-
ent quality attributes are reported in Table 1. The 
highest-quality hogs typically come from the other 
purchase arrangements (MA4). This is true for two 
out of ﬁve quality measurements: the thinnest aver-
age backfat (0.7455 inches) and the largest fat-free 
lean index (49.216). The second highest-quality 
hogs come through the other market formula pur-
chases (MA2) that also have two highest-quality 
attributes: the largest loin-eye area (7.36 square in), 
and the thickest average loin depth (2.45 in). We 
ranked MA4 ahead of MA2 because MA2 is also 
associated with the two worst quality attributes (the 
thickest average backfat of 0.7675 inches and the 
lowest fat-free lean index of 48.947), while MA4 
is never ranked last in any of the considered quality 
attributes. The only remaining quality attribute is 
the average lean percent. According to this attribute, 
the highest ranked AMA is the swine or pork market 
formula purchases (MA3) with the highest average 
lean percent of 54.31 percent.
Judging by the same ﬁve quality attributes, the 
lowest-quality hogs are recorded in the packer 
sold category (MA6). In three out of ﬁve quality 
attributes (average lean percent, loin-eye area, and 
average loin depth), MA6 ranked last, which seems 
to indicate that packers sell lower-quality hogs to 
other (perhaps small specialized) packers rather 
than slaughtering those hogs themselves.
Next, we test whether the means of a given qual-
ity attribute are statistically different across market-
ing arrangements. We use the paired observation 
procedure, which applies to samples with the same 
number of observations that are not independent and 
has variances of the two populations that are not 
3 See the ofﬁcial standards for swine in the Ofﬁcial United States 
Standards for the Grades of Slaughter Swine promulgated by the 
Secretary of Agriculture under the Agricultural Marketing Act 
of 1946 (60 Stat. 1087; 7U.S.C. 1621-1627), with amendments 
effective January 14, 1985. The USDA standards segregated 
swine according to intended use (slaughter or feeder), class 
(sex), and grade (apparent relative excellence and desirability 
for particular use). Grades of slaughter barrows and gilts were 
predicated on the same two general considerations that provided 
the basis for the grades of barrow and gilt carcasses: quality 
(which includes characteristics of the leanness and ﬁrmness 
of fat) and characteristics related to the combined carcass 
yields of the four lean cuts (ham, loin, picnic shoulder, and 
Boston butt). With respect to quality, two general levels were 
considered. Barrows and gilts with characteristics indicating 
that the carcass will have acceptable belly thickness and lean 
quality and acceptable ﬁrmness of fat receive grades U.S. No. 
1–4, whereas others are graded as U.S. Utility. The grades U.S. 
No. 1–4 were based entirely on the combination of factors that 
predict the expected combined carcass yields of the mentioned 
four lean cuts. The ofﬁcial grade for slaughter barrows and 
gilts having acceptable quality was determined by considering 
two characteristics: backfat thickness over the last rib and the 
muscling score. Values of these factors were then used in a 
mathematical equation to arrive at the ﬁnal grade.Vukina Quality Differences and Risk Shifting Associated with Alternative Marketing Arrangements   81
Table 1. Quality Attributes by Marketing Arrangement in the Hog Industry.
Marketing arrangement
Quality attributes MA1 MA2 MA3 MA4 MA5 MA6
Average lean Sample size 1,059 1,059 1,059 1,059 1,059 1,055
percentage Mean 53.38 53.95 54.31 54.09 53.40 53.23
SD 0.35 0.36 0.26 0.27 0.34 1.06
CV 0.65 0.66 0.49 0.50 0.63 1.99
Loineye area Sample size 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060 294 1,055
Mean 6.73 7.36 7.33 6.79 6.66 6.52
SD 0.12 0.23 0.12 0.15 0.09 0.36
CV 1.80 3.15 1.68 2.22 1.37 5.47
Average loin  Sample size 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,058 1,055
depth Mean 2.24 2.45 2.44 2.26 2.22 2.18
SD 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.12
CV 1.77 3.10 1.65 2.19 1.47 5.37
Average backfat Sample size 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,058 1,055
Mean 0.7668 0.7675 0.7474 0.7455 0.7666 0.7535
SD 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04
CV 2.78 2.51 2.42 2.06 2.68 5.20
Fat-free lean  Sample size 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,060 1,058 1,055
index Mean 48.955 48.947 49.193 49.216 48.957 49.118
SD 0.29 0.23 0.24 0.21 0.27 0.50
CV 0.59 0.48 0.50 0.42 0.54 1.01
SD = standard deviation
CV = coefﬁcient of variation
MA1 = Negotiated purchases
MA2 = Other market formula
MA3 = Swine or pork market formula
MA4 = Other purchase agreements
MA5 = Packer owned
MA6 = Packer soldJournal of Food Distribution Research 39(2) 82   July 2008
necessarily equal. A (1 − α) 100 percent conﬁdence 
interval for μD = μ1 – μ2 for paired observations is 
given by
(1)
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 and sd are the mean and standard deviation 
of the normally distributed differences of n random 
pairs of measurements, and tα/2 is the t-value with 
(n − 1) degrees of freedom (see Walpole and Myers 
1989, p. 254).
Tables 2–6 present the rankings of the marketing 
arrangements by their average quality attributes. For 
example, Table 2 presents the ranking of marketing 
arrangements with respect to average lean percent-
age. For example, the hogs with the highest average 
lean percentage of 54.31 percent came from swine 
or pork market formula (MA3), followed by the 
other purchase arrangement (MA4). In the right-
hand side panel of the Table, we test whether quality 
means are pair-wise different across alternative mar-
keting arrangements at the ﬁve-percent conﬁdence 
interval. As the results suggest, all lean percentage 
means are different from each other. Testing for 
the pair-wise differences across means produced 
similar results for other quality attributes. Most of 
the means are statistically signiﬁcantly different 
from each other.4 
Finally, for illustration purposes, the actual mea-
surements of the daily ﬂuctuations in two quality 
attributes of the best and the worst marketing ar-
rangements are graphed in Figures 1 and 2. In Figure 
1 the data exhibit a fairly large difference in loin 
Table 2. Ranking of Marketing Arrangements by Average Lean Percent.
Average lean percent   Are means pairwise different at α = 0.05?
(Decreasing quality rank) Mean (%) MA4 MA2 MA5 MA1 MA6
1. Swine/pork mkt formula (MA3) 54.31 yes yes yes yes yes
2. Other purchase arrangement (MA4) 54.09   yes yes yes yes
3. Other market formula (MA2) 53.95     yes yes yes
4. Packer owned (MA5) 53.40       yes yes
5. Negotiated (MA1) 53.38       yes
6. Packer sold (MA6) 53.23    
Table 3. Ranking of Marketing Arrangements by Loin-Eye Area.
Loin-eye area   Are means pairwise different at α = 0.05?
(Decreasing quality rank) Mean (in2) MA3 MA4 MA1 MA5 MA6
1. Other market formula (MA2) 7.36 yes yes yes yes yes
2. Swine/pork market formula (MA3) 7.33   yes yes yes yes
3. Other purchase agreement (MA4) 6.79     yes yes yes
4. Negotiated (MA1) 6.73       yes yes
5. Packer owned (MA5) 6.66       yes
6. Packer sold (MA6) 6.52    
4 The loin-eye area pairwise difference of any channel with 
the packer-owned channel is calculated based on the smaller 
sample because the packer-owned data have a lot of missing 
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Table 4. Ranking of Marketing Arrangements by Average Loin Depth.
Loin depth   Are means pairwise different at α = 0.05?
(Decreasing quality rank) Mean (in) MA3 MA4 MA1 MA5 MA6
1. Other market formula (MA2) 2.45 yes yes yes yes yes
2. Swine/pork market formula (MA3) 2.44   yes yes yes yes
3. Other purchase agreement (MA4) 2.26     yes yes yes
4. Negotiated (MA1) 2.24       yes yes
5. Packer owned (MA5) 2.22       yes
6. Packer sold (MA6) 2.18    
Table 5. Ranking of Marketing Arrangements by Average Backfat.
Backfat   Are means pairwise different at α = 0.05?
(Decreasing quality rank) Mean (in) MA3 MA6 MA5 MA1 MA2
1. Other purchase agreement (MA4) 0.7475 yes yes yes yes yes
2. Swine/pork market formula (MA3) 0.7474   yes yes yes yes
3. Packer sold (MA6) 0.7535     yes yes yes
4. Packer owned (MA5) 0.7666       no no
5. Negotiated (MA1) 0.7668       no
6. Other market formula (MA2) 0.7675    
Table 6. Ranking of Marketing Arrangements by Fat-Free Lean Index.
Fat-Free Lean Index   Are means pairwise different at α = 0.05?
(Decreasing quality rank) Mean (in) MA3 MA6 MA5 MA1 MA2
1. Other purchase agreement (MA4) 49.22 yes yes yes yes yes
2. Swine/pork market formula (MA3) 49.19   yes yes yes yes
3. Packer sold (MA6) 49.12     yes yes yes
4. Packer owned (MA5) 48.96       no no
5. Negotiated (MA1) 48.96       no
6. Other market formula (MA2) 48.95    Journal of Food Distribution Research 39(2) 84   July 2008
 
 
Figure 1. Average Loin Depth: January 2002–September 2005.
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depths between the best and the worst marketing 
arrangement (in this case, other market formula 
and packer sold), whereas in Figure 2, one sees 
that the difference between the best and the worst 
marketing arrangement (in this case, other purchase 
arrangements and other market formula) in terms 
of backfat is rather small.
The economic signiﬁcance of these statistically 
signiﬁcant quality differences across alternative 
marketing arrangements is difﬁcult to judge, as they 
appear to be quite small. One way to go about it is 
to look at hog-carcass merit-adjustment schedules 
that packers use to calculate quality premiums or 
discounts. In most marketing contracts, the total 
price that the producer will receive for his hogs is 
the combination of the base price (formula, cost-
plus, window, or ﬂoor price) and various quality 
premiums. Some contractors pay high base prices 
and low-quality premiums; others do the opposite. 
Some packers prefer lighter carcasses, whereas oth-
ers who specialize in boxed products may prefer 
heavier carcasses. In some contracts, the premiums 
are paid in dollars per pound; in other contracts, they 
are paid as a percentage of the base price. Contracts 
are typically speciﬁed such that the total payment to 
the producer is determined by adding the packer’s 
standard quality grid to the contracted base price.
Quality grids are typically two-dimensional ar-
rays where the bonus index is obtained by the inter-
section of two quality attributes: typically carcass 
weight and one other quality attribute, frequently 
average lean percent. An example of a carcass-
merit matrix from the Grain Inspection, Packers and 
Stockyards Administration swine contract library 
indicates that percent lean range (between 42 per-
cent and 60.9 percent) is given in grid increments of 
one percent, and the weight range (133–216 pounds 
carcass, which corresponds to 180–292 pounds live 
weight) is divided into ﬁve weight brackets. For 
example, for the leanest carcasses (between 60 
and 60.9 percent lean) and for live weight ranging 
between 232 and 263 pounds (which corresponds to 
172 to 195 pounds of carcass weight), the producer 
receives a price premium of ﬁve percent over the 
base price (index 105). The same weight category 
carcasses that are only 42 to 42.9 percent lean will 
receive a penalty of eight percent below the base 
price (index 92).
In our case, as seen from Table 2, the worst 
average lean percent (53.23 percent) is obtained 
with hogs from MA6 (packer sold) and the best 
(54.31 percent) from MA3 (swine or pork market 
formula). According to the quality grid table above, 
these percentages belong to different percent lean 
categories but for all ﬁve weight categories they 
would command the same premiums. In particular, 
for both lean percent categories (53.0–53.9 percent 
and 54.0–54.9 percent) the premium indexes are 88 
(for 133–145 pounds carcass weight), 92 (146–160 
pounds), 101 (161–171 pounds), 103 (172–195 
pounds), and again 103 (196–216 pounds). Based 
on the presented simple analysis one can conclude 
that, despite the fact that they are statistically signiﬁ-
cantly different from each other, live hogs purchased 
through six procurement channels appear to be of 
materially indistinguishable quality because they 
would all command the exact same premiums. This 
result may explain the packers’ ambiguity about 
the connection between the quality of live hogs 
and the increased use of the alternative marketing 
arrangements.
Quality Measurement Using Hicks’ Composite 
Commodity Index
In this section, we use national Mandatory Price 
Report data for current volumes by purchase type 
(daily observations on head count, barrows, and 
gilts) and pork carcass cut-out (weekly observations 
on primal values and load counts).5 The data have 
been aggregated into 50 monthly observations by 
calculating monthly sums of quantity variables and 
monthly simple averages of primal cuts values. The 
values of various pork cuts are deﬂated using the 
consumer price index for pork (1982–84 = 100).6
First, we construct the average quality index 
based on Hicks’ composite commodity formula 
(Theil 1952–1953; Cramer 1973; Nelson 1991). 
This quality index is formulated as
(2)












5 These observations were obtained from various issues of 
USDA National Meat Trade Review (http://www.ams.usda.gov/
LSMNpubs/PDFMonthly/ composite.htm).
6 These observations were obtained from various issues of 
USDA National Meat Trade Review (http://www.ams.usda.gov/
LSMNpubs/PDFMonthly/ composite.htm).Journal of Food Distribution Research 39(2) 86   July 2008
where xi are the quantities of elementary goods 
measured in pounds (various pork cuts: loin, butt, 
picnic, rib, ham, belly) that belong to the same 
commodity group G, pi are the wholesale prices 
per pound of various pork cuts, and qG = 
iG  ¤  xi is 
the heterogeneous commodity group (pork meat). 
Based on Equation 2, the larger the proportion of 
higher priced cuts in the total sales bundle, the 
higher the quality measure. To establish the link 
between pork quality and live hogs quality, we link 
the aggregate VG to the composition of alternative 
marketing arrangements for the upstream segment. 
This will give us some indication of the pork qual-
ity differences caused by different combinations of 
upstream alternative marketing arrangements.
To implement this method, we calculated the 
percentage share of all marketing arrangements 
other than negotiated purchases (MA1) and packer 
sold (MA6) in the total volume of live animals 
purchased. The variable is constructed as the ratio 
between (other market formula purchases + swine/
pork market formula purchases + other purchase 
arrangement + packer owned) and total purchases, 
where the total purchases contain all of the above 
methods plus negotiated (spot) purchases and 
packer sold. The prediction here is that alternative 
marketing arrangements should on average enable 
packers to acquire higher-quality hogs (and hence 
produce higher-quality pork) than those acquired 
on the cash/spot market or via the packer-sold 
channel.
The time plot of both series is presented in 
Figure 3. The percentage of alternative marketing 
arrangment purchases (HdCnt) exhibits a time trend, 
while the pork-quality index (VgDeﬂ) does not. This 
 
Figure 3. The Relationship between Pork Quality and the AMAs’ Share in Total Hog Purchases.
VGDeﬂ = Pork quality index using Hicks’ composite commodity formula.
HdCnt = Percentage of AMA purchases (headcount).Vukina Quality Differences and Risk Shifting Associated with Alternative Marketing Arrangements   87
clearly indicates that the steady increase in the use 
of higher-order alternative marketing arrangements 
in total swine procurement was not accompanied 
by an equal increase in pork quality. Because our 
purpose is to examine the qualitative relationship 
between the two time series, we calculated the cor-
relation coefﬁcient. The estimated sample correla-
tion coefﬁcient between the two series is 0.3661, 
with a 95-percent conﬁdence interval of (0.098, 
0.5849). Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis 
of no correlation between the pork quality and the 
share of alternative marketing arrangements in the 
total market hog purchases at the ﬁve-percent sig-
niﬁcance level.7 Based on this result, we conclude 
that more hogs purchased through alternative mar-
keting arrangements translate into higher-quality 
pork products, but the magnitude of that effect 
seems to be small. This result may also explain the 
packers’ ambiguity about the connection between 
the quality of live hogs and the increased use of the 
alternative marketing arrangements.
Risk Shifting
The literature suggests that hog producers (and 
economic agents in general) will, if offered a menu 
of alternative marketing arrangements where each 
arrangement is associated with some volatility of in-
come streams, self-select themselves correctly into 
the arrangements most conformable with their risk-
aversion type.8 Risk-neutral (or perhaps even risk-
loving) agents would choose risky projects, whereas 
risk-averse agents would choose safer bets. But 
since agents’ level of risk-aversion is not observ-
able and also generally very difﬁcult to measure, 
the available data does not allow us to stratify hog 
producers according to their risk-aversion attitudes, 
and so we cannot test whether they correctly sorted 
themselves into alternative marketing arrangements 
according to their riskiness. However, knowing that 
farmers risk attitudes and risk-bearing capabilities 
differ,9 we anticipate seeing different alternative 
marketing arrangements offering different levels 
of risk insurance, i.e. we expect to see different 
volatilities of income streams associated with vari-
ous alternative marketing arrangements. Measuring 
the difference in riskiness (volatility) of different 
alternative marketing arrangement income streams 
becomes an interesting empirical question. 
 Hog farmers are concerned with several types 
of risk. The most important among them is price 
risk (both on the input side as well as on the output 
side), followed by various types of production risks 
(common and idiosyncratic), and ﬁnally, market-ac-
cess risk. Various types of marketing arrangements 
are associated with different levels of risk, and they 
can transfer different components of the total risk 
from the producer/farmer to the contractor (packer 
or integrator). Production contracts usually elimi-
nate the entire price risk and the market-access risk 
from the responsibility of the producer. They could 
also eliminate the common production risk in cases 
where the payment to the grower is based on some 
relative performance scheme. Marketing contracts 
generally eliminate market-access risk, could some-
times eliminate some of the price risk, but would 
generally not eliminate production risk. Finally, 
cash or spot-market sales expose the producer to 
all types of risk associated with hog production.
The analysis of risk shifting is accomplished 
by measuring the variances of payments received 
by producers selling their hogs through different 
alternative marketing arrangment channels and test-
ing whether the pairwise differences among those 
variances are statistically signiﬁcant. Because we 
are interested in comparing the volatilities in the 
marketing contracts channels against the spot/cash 
market, we exclude marketing channel MA5, be-
cause it covers the packer-owned hogs, and MA6, 
where the origin of hogs is unknown.10 
Assuming that the variance of the price through 
each arrangement over time represents the risk of 
7 The t-test statistic (2.726) is greater than the critical value 
(2.01).
8 For example, Zheng, Vukina, and Shin (2007) have shown 
that hog farmers who use production contracts are more risk 
averse than are farmers who use spot markets or marketing 
contracts. 
9 For example, Pennings and Wansink (2004) found that 39 
percent of Dutch hog producers were risk averse, four percent 
were risk neutral, and 57 percent risk seeking.
10 Ideally, we would like to measure the amount of risk 
transferred from the producers to the integrators or packers 
under production contracts, but the contract settlements data 
is not part of the MPR database. However, in an earlier study 
Martin (1997) showed that production contracts eliminate 
about 94 percent of the total income variability to which an 
independent farmer selling hogs on the spot market would be 
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that particular arrangement, we compiled the daily 
average net prices of each arrangement from August 
3, 2001 through March 27, 2006, and conducted a 
pair-wise test of equal variance. The prices are base 
prices for barrows and gilts, carcass basis expressed 
in $/cwt. Greater variance of payments indicates the 
higher risk (see Table 7). Based on the computed 
variances (main diagonal elements in Table 7), we 
ordered the marketing arrangements according to 
the magnitude of risk they carry: MA1, MA3, MA2, 
and MA4. This order is quite intuitive: MA1 is cash 
or spot-market sales, which should obviously have 
the greatest risk; MA3 is marketing contracts whose 
pricing formula is based on different spot markets; 
MA2 is another type of marketing arrangement 
whose pricing formula is based on some futures or 
options price; and MA4 contains ledgers, windows, 
and other pricing mechanisms, which all serve as a 
cushion against the price volatility.
The amount of risk, as measured by the variance 
of price, that can be eliminated by switching away 
from the spot market (MA1) and instead selling the 
hogs through one of the marketing contracts could 
be economically signiﬁcant. For example, the vari-
ance of price obtained though MA4 channel (other 
purchase agreements) is only about one-third of the 
variance of negotiated (spot) price and quite similar 
to the variance of other market-formula purchases 
(MA2). However, the variance of price associated 
with the swine or pork market formula (MA3), 
whose contract price is determined by some spot-
market price, offers hardly any insurance against 
price risk. The variance of MA1 is only about 10 
percent higher than the variance of MA3. 
To test the null hypothesis that the variances of 
the payments are identical under two different types 
of arrangements, we can use the asymptotic Wald 
test proposed by Knoeber and Thurman (1995). The 
test statistic is given by 
(3)
























2 are the sample variances for two 
different payment time series and s12 is the sample 
covariance. Under the null, T is asymptotically stan-
dard normal. This test is needed when the two price 
series are not statistically independent (otherwise, 
the standard F-test could be used for testing the 
equal variances).
For different combinations of ordered variances 
for i and j, the null and the alternative hypotheses 
are given as
(4) H 0 : Var(price of MAi) = Var(price of MAj)
      H1 : Var(price of MAi) > Var(price of MAj).
The results are summarized in Table 8. The re-
sults indicate that all null hypotheses were rejected 
at one-percent level of signiﬁcance. The pair-wise 
testing of the differences in prices across various 
marketing arrangements thus conﬁrmed that all 
price variances are statistically different from each 
other. We therefore conclude that the magnitude 
of risk that hog producers are exposed to varies 
with the marketing arrangements through which 
the hogs are transacted. Aside from the production 
contracts, which are designed to transfer almost the 
entire risk associated with growing hogs from the 
producer to the contractor, the most insurance to 
producers against the price risk is provided by MA4 
Table 7. Variance-Covariance Matrix of Hogs Prices by Marketing Channel.
Marketing channel MA1 MA2 MA3 MA4
MA1 132.89 71.64 126.13 75.63
MA2 52.71 68.03 39.52
MA3 120.18 72.37
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(other purchase agreements) that contains ledgers, 
windows, and other pricing mechanisms, which all 
serve as a cushion against price volatility.
Conclusions
This article analyzes quality differences in live mar-
ket hogs across alternative procurement methods. 
First, we tested if various quality attributes used 
by the industry are signiﬁcantly different across 
marketing arrangements. Test results indicate that 
different marketing arrangements yield different 
quality hogs but the rankings are not unique but 
rather vary with the quality attributes. We also 
found that despite the fact that marketing contracts 
(especially other purchase arrangements and other 
market formula purchases) consistently yield statis-
tically higher-quality hogs than did negotiated (spot) 
purchases, the quality differences do not appear to 
be economically signiﬁcant.
Second, we examined the relationship between 
the proportion of the higher level procurement 
methods in the total acquisition of live market hogs 
and the quality of resulting pork products. We mea-
sured pork quality by Hicks’ composite commodity 
index and assumed that a higher percentage share of 
the alternative marketing arrangements (marketing 
contracts and packer-owned hogs) should produce 
higher-quality pork products. The correlation coef-
ﬁcient showed that these two series are positively 
correlated, but the magnitude of that effect seems 
to be small, which may explain the packers’ ambi-
guity about the connection between the quality of 
live hogs and the increased use of the alternative 
marketing arrangements.
Finally, we analyzed the transfer of risk from 
risk-averse farmers to risk-neutral (or less risk-
averse) ﬁrms (integrators and packers). We were 
able to show that different types of marketing ar-
rangements exhibit different price volatilities as 
measured by the variance of price; thus they may 
subject the producers selling their hogs through 
these channels to different levels of risk. The or-
dering of marketing arrangements by the risk they 
carry is quite intuitive: (1) cash/spot-market sales; 
(2) marketing contracts whose pricing formula is 
based on different spot markets; (3) marketing ar-
rangements whose pricing formula is based on some 
futures or options price; and (4) other purchase ar-
rangements containing ledgers, windows, etc., and 
all variances are statistically signiﬁcantly different 
from each other. However, the magnitude of the 
actual risk reduction for some alternative marketing 
arrangements (for example MA3) is not very large, 
indicating that other aspects of business risk, such 
as market access risk, may be dominating price-risk 
Table 8. Test for Risk Reduction: Cash Sales and AMAs.
Testsa Wald test statistic p value
MA1b vs. MA2c 19.37 0.000
MA1 vs. MA3d 18.42 0.000
MA1 vs. MA4e 22.49 0.000
MA3 vs. MA2 18.42 0.000
MA3 vs. MA4 22.31 0.000
MA2 vs. MA4 2.73 0.003
a Test (MAi vs. MAj) hypotheses are
        H0 : Var(price of MAi) = Var(price of MAj)
        H1 : Var(price of MAi) > Var(price of MAj)
b MA1: Negotiated purchases
c MA2: Other market formula
d MA3: Swine or pork market formula
e MA4: Other purchase agreementsJournal of Food Distribution Research 39(2) 90   July 2008
consideration for many farmers.
All of the above results seem to be casting some 
doubts into the standard explanations for why we 
observe contracts and other forms of vertical coordi-
nation in the livestock-production and meat-packing 
industries. First, when it comes to packers’ motiva-
tions for using alternative marketing arrangements, 
the quality-control considerations seem to be over-
played. This conclusion follows from the analysis 
of packers’ own responses to survey questions as 
well as from the statistical analysis of quality dif-
ferences of live hogs purchased through different 
channels. Further research into this very interesting 
topic is critically needed. Second, when it comes 
to producers’ motivations, the risk-management 
rationale, albeit important, seems to require differ-
ent interpretation. It is probably not the price risk 
per se that motivates producers to use contracts; 
the security of market access and timing could be 
something they worry more about. 
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